The Founders of the United States of America detested political parties as antithetical to a solid republican government. Yet, like it or not, organized parties have dominated America's political scene since our country's very inception. The parties have by no means stayed the same, though; over the past two-and-a-quarter centuries, the names and platforms of America's political parties have been constantly shifting, changing, evolving. As our country grows, our party system grows, and as the fundamental issues facing our nation shift, so do party labels and alignments.

But how, exactly, has this truism manifested itself throughout America's history? How has our system of political parties evolved since our country's inception, and how has this evolution reflected the changing dilemmas that our nation has faced throughout the decades? By exploring the various political parties that have appeared throughout American history, and by examining the central themes around which these parties developed, we can begin to understand this complex issue.

In 1834, the North American Review published a piece entitled "The Origin and Character of the Old Parties." Reflecting on America's previous party system, the article pointed out that the very first political parties in America were the pre-Revolution Whigs and Tories. Support for the English King and Parliament--or virulent lack of support--was the only issue around which these two parties developed: the Tories were fiercely loyal to the American colonies' Mother Country, Great Britain, while the Whigs harbored a more revolutionary spirit. The simplicity of this one-issue division made it rather easy for a colonist to identify which party he belonged in--he was either for or against King George III. "Socially, I'm a Whig, but fiscally I tend to agree with the Tories," was not a phrase you were likely to hear in pre-1776 America.

However, as the North American Review pointed out, this simple party division quickly toppled with the advent of the American Revolution. "The entire prostration of the [loyalist Tories] in the war of Independence, and the success of the new government erected by the [revolutionary Whigs] upon the ruins of the colonial system, extinguished this division…" Thus, the time during which the colonists fought the Revolutionary War was essentially a period of one-party rule; the only "issue" of any consequence was the goal of winning the war, and the only real American party was that of patriot. However, with the colonists' success in the war, this period of unity quickly came to an end as Americans faced the complex task of establishing a new government.

As leading Americans tackled the formation of this new government, and as varying ideas and ideologies manifested themselves, there sprang up two camps: the Federalists and the Antifederalists. The Federalists had drafted a Constitution, which they hoped to have ratified as America's new form of government, while the Antifederalists opposed this Constitution. Thus the surface issue which the new party division reflected was the tension between supporters and opponents of the proposed Constitution.

However, the deeper clash of ideologies which this division revealed was that of states' rights versus a strong central government. Federalists, such as John Jay and Alexander Hamilton, promoted the latter, attracted by a strong Federal government's efficiency and stability. On the other hand, Antifederalists, such as Patrick Henry and Richard Henry Lee, feared a strong central government and preferred a looser confederation of the States; in fact, many Antifederalists advocated merely amending the already-existing Articles of Confederation, which constituted a very loose alliance of essentially sovereign states. Although the Federalists eventually ruled the day and pushed through ratification of the Constitution, the issue around which the Federalist and Antifederalist parties had developed--state sovereignty versus Union supremacy--would continually reoccur throughout America's existence.

Indeed, as soon as the Constitution was adopted, a new party division sprang up, one which closely mirrored the old Federalist/Antifederalist division. The new warring parties were the Federalists and the Democratic-Republicans (also known simply as the Republicans.) Again reflecting the tension between federal power and state sovereignty, the Federalists and Republicans this time disagreed on interpretation of the Constitution: the Federalists favored giving the Federal government broad "implied" powers through "loose construction" of the Constitution, whereas the Republicans supported a limited Federal government and advocated a narrower interpretation of the Constitution known as "strict construction." Says the North American Review: "…in considering the measures of the Federal Government, the question constantly recurred, whether they were or were not within the limits of its constitutional power, and of course what those limits were." As examples, the article then goes on to list measures such as the Alien and Sedition Acts and the National Bank, all of which were opposed "not merely as inexpedient, but as unconstitutional."

Hence the new party division of Federalists and Democratic-Republicans mirrored the old Federalist/Antifederalist division, and initially turned upon the question of interpretation of the Constitution. However, as the North American Review explained in another excerpt from its incisive article, new issues of a more global nature soon entered the picture and intensified the division between the Federalists and the Republicans. First came the French Revolution, which the already-francophilic Jeffersonian Republicans lauded as a victory for liberty; the order-loving Federalists, on the other hand, were horrified at the apparent mob rule and the bloody Reign of Terror which the French Revolution produced. The second issue was the Napoleonic Wars, in which the Federalists and Republicans tended to lean toward, respectively, Britain and France. When the U.S. became involved in a naval conflict with France during the Federalist Adams administration, the Alien and Sedition Acts were passed to quash Democratic-Republican dissent. When the U.S. was on the brink of the War of 1812 with Great Britain during the Republican Madison administration, the Federalists were condemned as traitors for their opposition to war.

Thus, from the time of the Constitution's ratification through the War of 1812, there existed two parties, the Federalists and the Democratic-Republicans, whose disagreeing platforms reflected issues--both domestic and foreign--that plagued the nascent nation. Both opposing ideologies were ardent, and animosity between the two parties was often intense. In an excerpt from his memoir, The Anas, Republican apologist Thomas Jefferson describes his stormy relationship with Federalist Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton during his own tenure as Secretary of State. Jefferson condemns Hamilton's financial system and accuses him of favoring the monarchical British model of government--one, according to Jefferson, that is based on "corruption." Hamilton harbored equally bitter sentiments toward Jefferson and the Democratic-Republicans, as evidenced by a 1792 letter to Edward Carrington. In this correspondence, Hamilton accuses the Republicans of harboring an unreasonable resentment toward Great Britain and an unreasonable affection toward France--"womanish," he calls it. Hamilton also describes in the letter how he sees the Republicans as advocating an irrational eschewing of any form of Federal authority, no matter how benign. These two bitter pieces of writing on the part of Jefferson and Hamilton, then, reflect the burgeoning intensity of the Federalist/Republican divide. Each new question of Constitutional interpretation, each new diplomatic dilemma concerning Britain or France, intensified the struggle between the Jeffersonians and the Hamiltonians. Each cry of "Britain-loving monarchist!" and "France-loving anarchist!" weakened whatever goodwill remained between the two parties. It also strengthened the two-party system, as the divide between the two ideologies became increasingly profound.

This divide came to a head during the early stages of the War of 1812--a war which the Federalists opposed. This opposition heralded the Federalist Party's downfall, however, as they were perceived as traitors by the majority of the public. With the death of the Federalists after the War of 1812, then, there came a period of one-party rule under the Democratic-Republicans. Ironically, the Republicans soon began to adopt "neo-Federalist" policies, including financial schemes that smacked suspiciously of those that Hamilton had advocated. Having defeated their opponents, the Democratic-Republicans were beginning to become their opponents. What was going on?

The Era of Good Feelings was what was going on. The post-1812 era--or the "Era of Good Feelings," as it is sometimes called--was one of prosperity, unity, and growth. The lack of partisan bickering and the spirit of compromise that pervaded America's political system during the Era of Good Feelings merely reflected the issues which preoccupied the country at the time. These were issues that fostered unity and compromise: economic growth, internal improvements, westward expansion. America had asserted her independence by fighting Great Britain to a stalemate in the War of 1812, and in the process had destroyed the bitter Federalist/Republican two-party system. War was over, and so was partisan strife. America was ready to turn inward and develop domestically, to compromise, to unify. "We are all Republicans, we are all Federalists," was a popular motto of the day.

Later Americans would look back on this era, particularly the Monroe presidency, with unqualified longing. An 1864 article in Harper's New Monthly Magazine nostalgically recounts the Era of Good Feelings' "extraordinary lull in party strife" and contrasts it with "the dominant selfishness of the present day." The article speaks glowingly of President Monroe, who--although a Democratic-Republican--was not averse to neo-Federalists policies and therefore personified the era very well.

"An uniter, not a divider," is how presidential candidate George W. Bush would describe himself in the year 2000. Nearly 190 years earlier, during the Era of Good Feelings, the issues facing the nation were those which tended to unite, not divide, and the era's "extraordinary lull in party strife" reflected this spirit of unity. However, a pessimist could have argued that this era of amity was too good to last. And he would have been right.

Indeed, several events and issues helped destroy this newfound spirit of political unity and fostered the return of the two-party system. First came the financial panic of 1819, which cultivated newfound suspicion of neo-Federalist economic policies. Next came the contentious election of 1824, during which John Quincy Adams gained the presidency despite General Andrew Jackson's winning the popular vote; this event caused many ordinary Americans to feel a new sense of distrust toward the political system. However, the true death-blow to the Era of Good Feelings came with the election of Andrew Jackson in 1828. A staunch "man of the people," Jackson detested anything that even remotely smacked of corrupt bureaucracy or elitist aristocracy; he espoused an extreme form of laissez-faire economics and advocated policies that would democratize the political system and give power to ordinary people. (Jackson, incidentally, dropped the "Republican" from "Democratic-Republican"; his party simply became known as the Democratic Party.)

Somewhat paradoxically, Jackson implemented his democratic philosophy by seriously stretching the bounds of presidential power--a very undemocratic way of acting. From his war against the National Bank to his authoritarian handling of the nullification crisis in South Carolina, Jackson's actions quickly led to his opponents' dubbing him "King Andrew." They also led to the rise of a strong political opposition, eventually named the Whig Party. A diverse coalition of anti-Jacksonians, the Whigs tended to advocate greater federal authority and more governmental control of the economy. They supported the National Bank and a policy of protectionism, and they contemptuously considered the Jacksonians' "democratic" philosophy as mere class warfare rhetoric. An 1845 article in the American Whig Review said of the Democratic Party, "By its stupid cry of aristocracy, it has sought to engender the most unnatural war between those natural allies, the poor and the rich…"

The American Whig Review article also voices other common criticisms of the Jacksonian Democrats. It condemns the Democratic Party's "spoils system," in which government jobs were distributed to political patrons; its opposition to protectionism and federally funded internal improvements; its opposition to the National Bank; and its "den[ying] to the central government all legitimate and healthy powers." It also touts Whig policies as having reinvigorated the economy and urges readers to--of course--vote Whig.

Not everyone had such a high opinion of Whig policies, however. Focusing on the National Bank issue, an 1838 article in The United States Democratic Review poses a scathing indictment of the Whig Party, comparing it to the monarchical conservatives in England. By attempting to institute the bank, the article claims, the Whigs strive for a "moneyed despotism" over the nation, and would use domination of the treasury as an avenue for Federal domination of other aspects of America. According to the article, the question, then, is "bank or Constitution?"

Hence these juxtaposed articles in the two Review's highlight the central issues on which the Whigs and Democrats differed, as well as common stereotypes of both parties. It is interesting to note that, once again, this new party division reflected an old party division. The Democratic Party was essentially a metamorphosed version of Jefferson's Democratic-Republican Party, and the Whigs strongly echoed Hamilton's old Federalist Party. The main difference between the old and new party divisions lay in the matter of states' rights; although the old Democratic-Republican Party had advocated strong state sovereignty, neither the Whigs nor the Democrats truly stood for states' rights. Perhaps some Democrats during the Jackson era advocated state sovereignty, but Jackson himself, the leader of the Democratic Party, can hardly be called a states' rights advocate. Thus the Whig/Democrat divide echoed the old Federalist/Republican divide in many ways, but not in all.

Tariffs, the national bank, the legitimacy of Jackson's "spoils system"--Whigs and Democrats passionately debated these issues during the Jackson era. Soon, however, all of these topics would be overshadowed by a new issue, one that would dominate America's political scene for the next decade, would foster yet another re-making of the nation's party system, and would culminate in the bloodiest war in United States history.

The issue was slavery. After the United States gained a large quantity of western territories through its successful war with Mexico, Americans hotly debated whether slavery should be allowed to spread into the new territories. This territorial debate, combined with rising abolitionist sentiment in the North, quickly brought the slavery issue to the foreground. Since the slavery issue was only vaguely addressed in the Constitution, this allowed both pro-and anti-slavery advocates to "spin" the Constitution to fit their own preferred interpretation, further heightening the conflict. Attempts to resolve the issue, such as the Compromise of 1850, the Kansas-Nebraska Act, and the Dred Scott decision, all added fuel to the fire and intensified outrage on both sides.

The slavery issue's newfound hegemony over America's political atmosphere posed a problem for the Whig Party. Already losing steam after the death of Whig president Zachary Taylor, the Whigs further decreased in popularity as they failed to take a strong position on slavery. The Democrats, who had always been strong in the South, were quickly becoming the pro-slavery party; it only made sense that the Whigs should accept their role as the opposition, the anti-slavery party. Yet the Whig Party was not built around the issue of slavery. A diverse coalition of economic Federalists, the Whigs were divided on the slavery issue, and the party refused to metamorphose into an exclusively abolitionist faction. This refusal proved to be the Whigs' downfall, however, as pro-slavery Whigs fled to the Democratic Party and anti-slavery Whigs joined newly-formed anti-slavery groups, such as the Free Soil Party.

But here history failed to repeat itself. After the downfall of the Federalists, there had come a blissful era of political unity. Yet the same was not the case after the Whigs' downfall. Almost immediately, there arose a new opposition party to challenge the Democrats, this time one that was built around the slavery issue. A coalition of Free-Soilers, anti-slavery Whigs, and other abolitionist groups, the new party called themselves the Republicans. "Free soil, free labor, free men!" was their motto.

Although radical abolitionists--those like William Lloyd Garrison, who advocated the immediate and total abolition of slavery--gained strength and prominence during the 1850's, the main debate centered around the extension of slavery into the territories. Thus the Republican and Democratic platforms reflect this central conflict. The Republican platform of 1856 stresses the Founders' ideals of liberty's "inalienable rights" and strongly implies that these privileges should be extended to all citizens, including slaves. More overt is the platform's condemnation of slavery's extension into the territories; it insists that "it is both the right and the imperative duty of Congress to prohibit in the Territories those twin relics of barbarism--Polygamy, and Slavery…"

The antithesis of the 1856 Republican platform, the Southern Democratic (or Breckinridge faction) platform of 1860 insisted that slaves, as the "property" of their owners, could--as with any other "property"--be taken anywhere their owners chose, including to the new territories. Further, the platform insisted that any property taken to territories must be allowed to remain there after statehood. In other words, if a slave owner brought his slaves to a territory that later became a state, that state's constitution had to legalize slavery.

Although the other Democratic faction of 1860, the Douglas faction, waffled a bit more on the slavery issue than did the Breckinridge faction, the general party lines were still clearly drawn. Slavery was the issue of the hour. Stemming from the slavery issue, however was the issue of states' rights. Pro-slavery Democrats realized that they could bolster their position by claiming that states enjoyed the "right" to institute slavery if they so chose. In this way, the slavery issue caused the Democrats to shed their Jacksonian "Union supremacy" position and hearken back to Jeffersonian advocacy of state sovereignty. To counteract this position, Republicans--hearkening back to their own Federalist and Whig roots--adopted a platform of Union supremacy, claiming that the Federal government was authorized to banish repugnant practices, such as slavery, from the individual states.

Thus slavery, as well as the related issue of states' rights, dominated America's political scene during the 1850's. After Lincoln's election in 1860, the debate came to a head with the bloody Civil War. The issue ceased to be one of party politics and became a matter of life and death. Even after the Civil War, during Reconstruction, the Republicans' and Democrats' positions on slavery and states' rights dominated the political scene, molding federal policies toward the ex-rebel states and the newly-freed African-Americans. Yet sweeping changes were on the horizon. Revolutionary developments in technology and business would transform post-Reconstruction America, and these shifts would foster yet another drastic re-making of the two-party system. In the economic and social changes of the late 1800's, and in the restructuring of the party system that such changes fostered, would lie the foundations of the Republican and Democratic parties that we know today.

If the development of American political parties is literally to be considered in terms of evolution, then the parties of the post-Reconstruction era must be dubbed "intermediate links." In biology, an intermediate link is theoretically a temporary species that develops as one species evolves into another. The political parties of the late 1800's, then, were intermediate links between the parties of the Civil War and those of the modern day. While the mainstream Democratic and Republican parties sank into corrupt politicking during the late 1800's (they differed in few substantive areas), a variety of third parties and factions sprang up in response to numerous issues, from prohibition to monetary standards. By the end of the century, however, the numerous factions would begin to coalesce, and the Republicans and Democrats--having absorbed many of these factions--would once again differ substantively.

With the post-Reconstruction economic and technological boom, the nation was transformed from rural to urban, from a collection of small businesses to a country dominated by economic monopolies run by such men as J.P. Morgan, Andrew Carnegie, and John D. Rockefeller. Alongside the nation's urbanization and industrialization came innumerable new issues. They generally boiled down to social issues--such as prohibition, immigration, and the handling of unsanitary cities--and economic issues, such as anti-trust legislation, the practicality of a laissez-faire economy, and the viability of the gold standard. For each of these issues, factions and third parties developed, creating a dizzying array of groups.

An 1896 Mexican Herald column poked fun at this plethora of factions. "Soon the United States will have as many political parties as Spain and will be split up into innumerable factions and groups," the article commented dryly. It then proceeded to enumerate a comically long list of parties and factions, ending the article by listing "the voters who are on the fence" and "the voters who have taken to the woods." Despite the humor, however, the article is quite accurate in its list, which does indeed represent the numerous factions of the day. Both the Democratic and Republican parties contained "gold" and "free silver" factions; these titles respectively represented party members who were for or against the gold standard. The Prohibition Party, concerned by drunkenness in newly-developed urban areas, supported prohibition of alcohol. However, the most important of these factions was undoubtedly the Populist Party. Derived from a movement of indebted and impoverished farmers, the Populists advocated abolition of the gold standard, government ownership of utilities, greater federal control of the economy to regulate "exploitative" businesses, and a larger social welfare role for the State.

At first the Populists were merely a fringe movement. They did manage to make gains at the local level, especially in the West, but at the national level they enjoyed few successes. Yet Populist concerns and proposals struck a chord with many mainstream Americans, who preferred not to align themselves with a third party. The solution was obvious: one of the two mainstream parties could absorb the Populists, taking many of their positions while taming their perceived extremism.

In the 1896 presidential election, the Democrats did just that. Under the leadership of young silverite-orator-turned-presidential-candidate William Jennings Bryan, the Democrats in effect stole the Populists' thunder, adopting many of their positions. An 1896 cartoon in the left-wing newspaper The Verdict represents the Democrats' new platform. Bryan is depicted as an honest woodsman--a "man of the people"--standing among his fellow workingmen. Carrying an ax, the Democratic candidate is surrounded by trees labeled with various Populist positions: anti-trust, free silver, lower tariffs, anti-imperialism, and the like. Standing next to the largest tree, the one labeled "anti-trust," Bryan peers down at a cherubic little girl. Pointing at the "anti-trust" tree, the child asks, "Mr. Bryan, isn't that a healthy tree to get your main plank from?" The child's suggestion was a good one. The anti-trust issue was a fitting focal point for Bryan's campaign, since it contained elements of distrust of big business, desire for government regulations, and desire to assist "exploited" workers--everything the Populists stood for. The anti-trust issue was representative of the broader Populist mentality; thus, as the child in the cartoon recognized, it was an appropriate main plank for Bryan's Democratic/Populist platform.

However, not everyone viewed the newly-formed Populist-Democratic alliance in such a favorable light. An 1896 cartoon in the L.A. Times condemns the "Demo-Popocratic doctrine." In the drawing, three witches leap maniacally about a huge "Popocratic cauldron" as they toss ingredients--labeled "repudiation," "fiatism," "anarchy," and "sophistry"--into the bubbling brew. The burning logs on which the cauldron rests are labeled with terms such as "anarchy," "sectionalism," and "discontent." Rising from the witches' mixture is a foul-looking smoke that reads "Demo-Popocratic doctrine." The cartoon's message is clear: Populist "witches"--such as Bryan--base their doctrine on ill-founded positions, and further their message by employing fallacious rhetoric and by stirring up sectional and class discord.

The accusation was a familiar one. Only sixty years earlier, the Whigs had accused the Jacksonian Democrats of stirring up class hatred and advocating harmful policies. Those policies, based on Jackson's democratic laissez-faire philosophy, had differed markedly from the Bryan Democrats' socialistic views. Yet the stereotypes foisted on the Jackson Democrats and the Bryan Democrats were nearly identical. It seems, then, that issues change more quickly than political rhetoric does.

At any rate, one cannot overestimate the importance of the 1896 election. With the Democrats' adoption of Populist positions, the fundamentals of the modern Democratic Party were born. In many ways, Bryan's 1896 platform would define the Democratic Party's fundamental philosophy throughout the 20th century. A larger social welfare role for the government, greater regulation of big business, economic policies that favored the poor--all of these positions would remain an integral part of the Democratic Party.

What of the Republicans? Perhaps another science analogy is called for: for every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction. The Democrats' revolutionary transformation prodded the Republicans out of their own stupor, causing them to mount a strong opposition to Democratic/Populist policies. 1896, then, could also be considered the birth-year of the modern Republican Party. In their opposition to Bryan's platform, the Republicans developed strong views on the necessity of limited government and economic freedom--views that still define the Republican Party today.

Clearly, the 1896 election marked the birth of the modern Republican and Democratic parties. But it was only a beginning. The next thirty-five years would still be a period of transitions and vicissitudes for the two parties. In 1931, however, one man--Franklin Delano Roosevelt--would change all that. Roosevelt's election would finish what William Jennings Bryan's candidacy started; his New Deal would clarify the Republicans' and Democrats' central philosophies, and would cement the two parties' modern identities.

Bryan lost in 1896, and again in 1900. The country chose the conservative road in those two elections, and this may have sobered the Democrats, taming some of their radicalism. The Democratic Party still maintained its newfound Populist fundamentals, but the party began to return to the mainstream. The divide between the Republicans and Democrats narrowed. Further muddling the Republican/Democratic divide was the advent of progressive Republicans, such as Theodore Roosevelt, who shared many of the Democrats' ideals. Indeed, when TR and Democrat Woodrow Wilson faced off in the 1912 presidential election, their respective programs of "New Nationalism" and "New Freedom" differed more in rhetoric than in actual policy.

Once he was elected, Wilson's left-wing economic policies--notably, his institution of a federal income tax--alienated many conservatives and re-widened the gap between Republican and Democratic policies. In addition, Wilson's uncompromising advocacy of a League of Nations after World War I also incurred Republican dissent. (Incidentally, foreign policy was one area in which William Jennings Bryan did not set the precedent for the Democratic Party. Bryan's isolationist anti-imperialism failed to catch on; indeed, two of the century's greatest internationalist presidents--Wilson and FDR--would be Democrats. And by the end of Wilson's presidency, most isolationists in Congress sat on the Republican side of the aisle.) Clearly, then, Wilson's policies did re-open the Republican/Democratic gap, helping to clinch the differences between the two parties. Still, the political identity crisis was not over; something even more drastic than Wilson's policies was needed in order to truly cement the Republican and Democratic parties into their modern forms.

After the 1920's, a decade of essentially laissez-faire Republican government, that "something" arrived. Republican president Herbert Hoover got the heave-ho after the stock market crash of 1929 and subsequent depression, and in 1932, a Democrat named Franklin Delano Roosevelt came to power. Roosevelt's first one hundred days as president easily matched Wilson's entire presidency in terms of drastic changes. A staunch liberal, Roosevelt's program of economic recovery--his "New Deal"--constituted a marked increase in governmental control of the economy. Banking policy, agriculture, energy, and many other aspects of the economy fell under federal control. Many of Roosevelt's policies strongly echoed those advocated by the Populists and Bryan Democrats in the late 1890's. The rebirth of the Democratic Party that had begun in 1896 was finally coming to fruition; what Bryan had started, Roosevelt was finishing.

After his revolutionary first one hundred days, Roosevelt's left-wing policies continued throughout his first term, culminating in the 1935 Social Security Act. In November of that year Roosevelt came up for reelection, and the 1936 Democratic party platform clarified his New Deal philosophy. Once again echoing the rhetoric of the Jackson Democrats of the 1830's and the Bryan Democrats of the turn of the century, the platform exhibited class-warfare themes by condemning the Republicans' "surrender to the dictatorship of a privileged few…" It touted the Roosevelt administration's "humanizing policies" and promised their continuation if the president is reelected. Most striking however, was the platform's claim that it was the government's duty to ensure "the personal financial industrial and agricultural well-being of the American people." According to the platform, the State's obligations include "protection of the family and the home," "establishment of a democracy of opportunity for all the people," and "aid to those overtaken by disaster."

A broadened social welfare role for the government, a duty to ensure the personal well-being of every citizen, was what the Bryan Democrats had advocated. But the Bryan Democrats had lost. They never truly had a chance to institute their policies; Roosevelt did. As long as the Democrats' most radical proposals were confined to rhetoric between 1896 and 1932, their party's identity remained somewhat fuzzy. But once Roosevelt took Bryan's oratory and turned it into concrete laws and tangible programs, the Democratic Party's modern identity truly became clear. Hazy rhetoric became concrete fact. And hazy fundamentals became a concrete platform. The Democratic Party had finally matured, had finally affirmed its contemporary form.

The New Deal also caused the Republican Party to cement its modern identity. In essence, Roosevelt's policies helped the Republicans clarify what they did not stand for. In 1940's The Republican Opposition, Thomas and Doris Reed quote a Republican presidential candidate's condemnation of "the wastrel theory that you can spend yourself into prosperity." The Reeds articulate the Republicans' opposition to "the spending, borrowing, taxing, and business regulating policies of the Roosevelt Administration." Emphasizing that the Republican Party is not opposed to social welfare, but to Roosevelt's methods of achieving social welfare, the authors explain the Republicans' positive view of business. Commerce should be encouraged, they argue, not stifled. The nation must aim for "real jobs at real wages through revived commerce," not Roosevelt's temporary and artificial remedies.

The above views still define the Republican Party today. As the Democrats had done, the Republicans also affirmed their modern identity during the Roosevelt era. The New Deal was a model for both the Democrats and Republicans: for the former, it represented an ideal to be emulated; for the latter, it was a mistake to be avoided. And just as models are often essential in helping students understand a concept, this model helped both the Republican and Democratic parties understand what they truly stood for.

They have vacillated between moderation and extremism, and they have faced new and controversial issues, but the Republican and Democratic parties still maintain the ideals that they cemented during the New Deal era. In the last seventy years, the Republicans have seen Eisenhower's liberal "dynamic conservatism," Gingrich's right-wing "Contract With America," and everything in between. Yet the basic ideals of the Republican Party have not changed from those articulated by Thomas and Doris Reed during the Roosevelt era. As for the Democrats, they have seen everything from Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty to Bill Clinton's New Democrats, who claimed to support welfare reform. But FDR is still their model; the 1936 platform is still an apt representation of the Democrat Party's fundamental philosophy.

In other words, America's two-party system has not undergone any drastic evolution since the 1930's. The names and natures of our country's two main political parties have not changed. Yes, new issues have arisen: abortion, affirmative action, and other hot-button issues dominate the domestic front, and new foreign policy challenges are always developing. But these new issues have not fostered any revolutionary changes in our two-party system.

Could changes be on the horizon, though? Might our party system undergo any drastic evolution in the near future? It is impossible to predict with certainty, but revolutionary changes in the near future seem unlikely. Serious restructuring of our party system has always accompanied events that shake our nation to the core. The drafting of the Constitution, the Jacksonian revolution, the Civil War, the economic revolution of the late 19th century, the Great Depression--all these events heralded vital changes in the two-party system. Unless we elect another Jackson or face another Civil War, it seems improbable that our party system will undergo any fundamental changes in the near future.

Improbable, yes, but not impossible. An earth-shaking shift in the party system, though unlikely, is still entirely fathomable, and speculation as to its likelihood is both exciting and intriguing. Still, the ultimate question is not what kind of political parties we will have in the future; it is whether we will ever see an era without political parties. That was the Founders' dream, after all--wise leaders who would work together for the greater good, avoiding interested and shortsighted factions. At first glance, this situation does seem wholly unrealistic. As long as our country faces contentious issues, it seems that parties will form in order to make the contending more organized. Furthermore, organizations are not inherently harmful; on the contrary, they often foster efficiency and clarity of purpose. The problem, however, is when one begins to put party over principle. When party spirit is everything, when the opposition can never be right, when the entire system becomes an "us versus them" game--that is when political parties become dangerous. The Founders understood this, and consequently warned against factions. And although they perhaps went to the opposite extreme, advocating no political parties, we would still do well to heed their caution.